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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Wayne Conner appeals from the judgment of the district court
entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder and
destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence. On appeal, Conner argues
the district court erred when it denied his motion to admit hearsay statements at
1
trial under the “catchall” hearsay exception.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Conner murdered his father with a claw hammer and tried to cover it up.
(See R., pp. 1591, 1594.) Conner lived with his father, Otis Conner (hereinafter
“Otis”), age 87, in Meridian, Idaho. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2534, Ls. 16-17, p. 2537, Ls.
12-17.) Conner was in severe financial distress. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1829, L. 14 – p.
1838, L. 16, p. 1848, L. 8 – p. 1849, L. 9; Exs. 129, 129A.) In one month alone,
Conner received approximately 270 phone calls from debt collectors. (4/6/15 Tr.,
p. 1774, L. 25 – p. 1775, L. 10.) Conner had previously received money from
Otis, but Otis said he was going to stop giving money to Conner. (4/6/15 Tr., p.
1992, L. 8 – p. 1995, L. 22.)
On January 2, 2013, at their home in Meridian, Conner hit his father in the
head, at least three times, with a claw hammer. (See 4/1/15 Tr., p. 1297, L. 1 –
p. 1300, L. 1; Exs. 29, 30.)

At least two of the blows occurred inside the

residence, where the blood hit the living room ceiling, the wall, and the carpet.

1

The “catchall” hearsay exception (see I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6)) is also
referred to as the “residual” hearsay exception.
1

(4/1/15 Tr., p. 1227, L. 6 – p. 1228, L. 4; Ex. 150; see also Ex. 137.2) There was
so much blood it soaked through the carpet, through the floor padding, and
stained the floorboard underneath. (See 4/1/15 Tr., p. 1306, L. 13 – p. 1308, L.
25; Ex. 82.) Conner dragged Otis into the garage and staged a scene that made
it look like Otis fell from a ladder. (See 4/1/15 Tr., p. 1256, L. 16 – p. 1257 L. 8,
p. 1269, L. 9 – p. 1271 L. 23, p. 1320, L. 18 – p. 1322, L. 22; Exs. 9, 11, 137.)
On that same day, Conner deposited a check, made payable to Conner
from Otis for $3,100. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1882, L. 6 – p. 1885, L. 2, p. 1911, L. 5 – p.
1912, L. 19; Ex. 186.) However, the signature on the check did not match Otis’
signature. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1667, L. 25 – p. 1675, L. 14; Exs. 122C, 133.) After
depositing the check, Conner went to dinner. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1765, L. 18 – p.
1766, L. 9.) When he returned home he called 911 and reported that his father
had fallen in the garage. (3/25/15 Tr., p. 510, L. 13 – p. 513, L. 3; Ex. 1.)
Firefighters

and

paramedics

responded

to

Conner’s

house

and

pronounced Otis dead. (3/25/15 Tr., p. 577, L. 4 – p. 580, L. 18, p. 600, L. 7 – p.
602, L. 22, p. 618, Ls. 2-8.) Conner told the firefighters that he had come home
and found his father lying near the ladder. (3/25/15 Tr., p. 602, Ls. 8-14.)
The Meridian police also responded to assist the medics and take
pictures. (3/25/15 Tr., p. 522, L. 19 – p. 525, L. 17; Exs. 3-19.) The police,
based heavily upon the information they were initially given, classified Otis’ death
as an “unattended death.” (3/25/15 Tr., p. 533, L. 9 – p. 534, L. 14; 3/26/15 Tr.,

Exhibit 137 is a diagram of Conner’s residence and indicates the location of the
blood stains inside the residence.
2

2

p. 64, L. 19 – p. 649, L. 22.) An unattended death means the officer did not see
anything unnatural and there were no witnesses. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 649, Ls. 6-22.)
The next day, a pathologist in the Ada County Coroner’s office inspected
Otis’ body. (4/2/15 Tr., p. 1444, L. 24 – p. 1445, L. 3.) The pathologist observed
injuries to the back of Otis’ head and a laceration on his index finger. (4/2/15 Tr.,
p. 1448, L. 1 – p. 1450, L. 15; Ex. 29.) The pathologist did not have any of the
pictures taken by the Meridian Police Department, nor did he have any of the
investigative materials from the police. (4/2/15 Tr., p. 1458, L. 6 – p. 1460, L.
22.) Based upon limited information, including Conner’s statements that Otis fell
from a ladder, the pathologist concluded that Otis died from a blunt force trauma
from a fall. (Id.)
The next Monday, January 7th, Detective Joe Miller read the report
classifying Otis’ death as an “unattended death” and reviewed the pictures taken
by the Meridian Police Department. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 673, L. 21 – p. 675, L. 2;
Exs. 4-19.) When Detective Miller reviewed the pictures of the area around Otis’
head and the garage steps, he developed “some big concerns.” (Id.) From the
pictures it appeared that blood was coming to rest on the steps from different
directions. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 676, L. 8 – p. 678, L. 7.) This is inconsistent with a
single fall from a ladder. (Id.) A couple of days later Detective Miller got a
bloodstain pattern expert involved. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 681, L. 21 – p. 682, L. 21.)
Around the same time, Detective Miller got an unsolicited call from Doug
Conner, another one of Otis’ sons. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 682, L. 22 – p. 684, L. 5.)
Doug Conner called to express some concerns about whether Otis actually fell
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off a ladder. (Id.) After speaking with Doug Conner, Detective Miller spoke with
Randall Conner, another son. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 684, L. 6 – p. 685, L. 23.) Based
upon information gleaned from Doug and Randall Conner and information
provided by the bloodstain pattern expert, the police obtained and executed a
search warrant for Conner’s residence. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 685, L. 24 – p. 687, L. 1.)
Detectives found two stains on the carpet in between the dining room and
the living room. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 934, L. 4 – p. 937, L. 23; Exs. 31, 34, 37; see
also Ex. 137.) When detectives moved an oddly-positioned chair and rug, the
detectives observed two more stains near the vent. (Id.) Almost directly above
these stains, the detectives discovered a droplet of blood on the ceiling.
(3/27/15 Tr., p. 937, L. 24 – p. 938, L. 23; Exs. 85, 86.) This blood was eight
feet, eight inches up and about 30 inches from the wall. (Id.)
During the search of Conner’s house, forensic investigators used a
chemical, Leuco Crystal Violet (LCV), to test for the presence of blood. (3/27/15
Tr., p. 872, L. 20 – p. 873, L. 23.) LCV is a clear liquid, that when sprayed onto a
surface, reacts with a portion of the hemoglobin molecule that is found in blood.
(Id.) When it reacts, it turns an intense purple color. (Id.) LCV is a presumptive
test for the presence of blood that is done at the scene, with a subsequent
confirmatory test done in the laboratory. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 873, L. 9 – p. 874, L. 9.)
Near the stains on the carpet, the forensic investigators used LCV to test
along the windowsill in the living room and down the wall toward the carpet and
along the baseboards. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 878, Ls. 12-17, p. 881, Ls. 1-8.) The LCV
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reacted to the windowsill and the baseboard area. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 881, L. 12 –
p. 886, L. 1.)
The LCV also reacted to the floor in the kitchen and around the kitchen
sink. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 888, L. 18 – p. 890, L. 21; Exs. 87-99.) The LCV indicated
“linear impressions” which the investigators reported as “drag marks.” (3/27/15
Tr., p. 893, L. 24 – p. 896, L. 24.) The LCV reacted to the floor of the laundry
room. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 897, L. 5 – p. 903, L. 1; Exs. 100-106.) The forensic
investigators again observed “linear reactions” which could indicate “drag marks.”
(Id.) Inside the house, the detectives found stains in the office, living room,
kitchen, laundry room, and in the area between the kitchen and laundry room.
(3/27/15 Tr., p. 970, L. 4 – p. 973, L. 18; Ex. 137.)
The forensic investigators also did preliminary tests to determine whether
a stain could be blood. (3/30/15 Tr., p. 1113, L. 8 – p. 1115, L. 21.) The stains
on the ceiling, living room wall, window blinds, archway, laundry room, and
kitchen all tested presumptively positive for blood. (3/30/15 Tr., p. 1148, L. 18 –
p. 1156, L. 18, p. 1158, L. 6 – p. 1159, L. 10, p. 1163, L. 8 – p. 1164, L. 21; Exs.
38, 39, 40, 41, 85, 110, 111, 137 180.) In the garage, the forensic investigator
also found multiple stains that tested presumptively positive for blood. (3/30/15
Tr., p. 1130, L. 2 – p. 1141, L. 25; Exs. 178, 179.)
Also in the garage, the detectives found a claw hammer with a red stain
on the flat surface of one of the prongs. (3/27/15 Tr., p. 825, L. 12 – p. 827, L.
17; Exs. 70, 71, 72, 114.)

The stain on the hammer tested presumptively

positive for blood. (3/30/15 Tr., p. 1145, L. 12 – p. 1147, L. 5; Ex. 71.)
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The Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory tested samples
taken from Conner’s house for DNA. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1220, L. 19 – p. 1221, L.
17.) The samples were compared with Otis’ DNA. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1221, L. 22 –
p. 1227, L. 5; Exs. 177, 150.) The DNA tests showed that Otis’ blood was found
in the rug in the laundry room, on the east living room wall, in the carpeting under
the vent, in the carpet cleaner (the SpotBot), on the underside of the chair in the
living room, and on the garage floor. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1227, L. 6 – p. 1228, L. 4;
Ex. 150.) The blood on the ladder leg was also Otis’ blood. (Id.) The blood on
the living room ceiling was also Otis’ blood. (Id.) The DNA test also showed the
blood on the claw of the hammer belonged to Otis. (Id.)
A grand jury indicted Conner for the crimes of murder in the first degree,
grand theft, forgery and destruction/concealment of evidence. (R., pp. 12-13.)
Prior to trial, Conner moved to admit statements allegedly made by Otis to Kelly
3
Riggs in the week before Otis’ death. (R., pp. 1036-1041.) Conner argued that

the victim’s prior statements were admissible because they fell under the
hearsay exceptions contained in Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3), 803(24) and
804(6). (Id.) The district court reserved ruling on Conner’s motion until trial.
(3/9/15 Tr., p. 109, L. 25 – p. 110, L. 23.) The case went to jury trial. (R., pp.
1353-1354, 1357-1373, 1375-1380, 1388-1395, 1494-1502, 1504-1507, 15521556.)

3

Conner initially alleged that Otis made statements to both Kelly Riggs and his
wife, Paula Riggs; however, when Conner presented his offer of proof he only
sought to admit statements Otis allegedly made to Kelly Riggs. (See 4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2289, L. 2 – p. 2290, L. 18.)
6

Tom Bevel, an expert on bloodstain pattern analysis, testified. (4/1/15 Tr.,
p. 1230, L. 23 – p. 1254, L. 12.) Mr. Bevel testified that the scene in the garage
was not consistent with a fall from a ladder. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1256, L. 16 – p. 1257
L. 8.) The scene in the garage was consistent with a “staging” to “make it appear
as if it [was] a fall from a ladder.” (Id.) The blood evidence in the garage was
consistent with someone dragging Otis and was inconsistent with Otis moving
around by himself. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1258, L. 8 – p. 1267, L. 15.) Further, the
position of the ladder was consistent with the stage of the scene. (4/1/15 Tr. p.
1267, L. 20 – p. 1269, L. 3; Exs. 171, 173.) The blood saturation on Otis’ shirt
and the blood on his right hand were also both consistent with Otis being moved
prior to the position in which he was found. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1269, L. 9 – p. 1271 L.
23; Exs. 9, 11.)
On the door leading from the garage to the house, there were blood
spatter stains that were consistent with blood coming off a bloody object that was
being swung. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1289, L. 10 – p. 1294, L. 3; Exs. 17, 18, 19.) The
spatter was consistent with an object striking Otis’ bloody head in the area above
the steps from the garage to the house. (Id.) The evidence in the garage was
consistent with a homicide. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1300, L. 12 – p. 1301, L. 13.)
Mr. Bevel also testified that a blood source lost a significant amount of
blood near the vent in the living room. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1303, L. 7 – p. 1304, L. 23;
Exs. 34, 35, 36.) The circular patterns near the vent indicated an attempt to
clean up this blood. (Id.) The SpotBot carpet cleaner, found in the office, was
consistent with the geometry of the circular blood stains near the vent. (4/1/15
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Tr., p. 1305, Ls. 8-22; Exs. 57, 58, 61.) The amount of blood going through the
carpet and the padding to the floorboard would require a significant injury.
(4/1/15 Tr., p. 1306, L. 13 – p. 1308, L. 25; Ex. 82.)
The blood stain on the ceiling in the living room indicated that there was
castoff blood which would require that Otis was struck twice in the house.
(4/1/15 Tr., p. 1312, L. 8 – p. 1314, L. 25; Exs. 85, 86.) There was also castoff in
the garage, which indicated that Otis was also struck in the garage. (4/1/15 Tr.,
p. 1315, Ls. 1-4.) These three strikes were consistent with the three wounds on
Otis’ head. (4/1/15 Tr., p. 1315, Ls. 5-8.)
The physical evidence indicated that a “bloodletting event” began in the
living room near the vent and then the body was moved from the living room to
the garage, where there was another impact on the steps leading to the garage.
(4/1/15 Tr., p. 1320, L. 18 – p. 1323, L. 4; Ex. 137.)

Otis was moved by

someone to multiple locations and there was an attempt to clean up the blood in
the house and “staging” in the garage. (Id.) Mr. Bevel summarized the import of
the bloodstain evidence:
Q.
So I want to go back to [Exhibit] 137. So looking at 137 –
and understanding that this leaves out indications of evidence that
was found out here in the garage – in looking at everything that we
have looked at in terms of photographs and everything we have
described today, does the scene suggest to you what happened
there at the house with the bloodletting events?
A.

It does.

Q.

And what does it suggest?

A.
That the bloodletting event begins in the living room area.
The blood source is down on the ground making contact with the
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chair. It is in two different locations on either side of the vent losing
enough blood to go through the carpet, the pad, into the subfloor.
We have, above that area, spatter consistent with an impact
into a blood source as well as a castoff up onto the ceiling.
We subsequently have movement from there – let me get
the laser out – movement from here that ultimately is producing
transfers onto the floor leading to the garage door consistent with
what we are finding outside the garage door, blood trails or trails
identified, not conclusively, to be blood but consistent with blood
going in the direction where we have blood outside on the steps,
that we have another impact out on the steps.
The deceased has been moved by somebody to multiple
locations. I would not pretend that I can tell you why those different
locations. It certainly is consistent with some staging as well as
concealment and cleanup inside the house, outside the house in
the garage placing a ladder into play that would suggest that this
could be a fall, but the physical evidence being inconsistent with a
fall.
(4/1/15 Tr., p. 1321, L. 10 – p. 1322, L. 22; Ex. 137.)
The forensic pathologist with the Ada County Coroner’s office testified that
the injuries to Otis’ head were consistent with the claws on the hammer found in
the toolbox. (4/2/15 Tr., p. 1451, L. 2 – p. 1453, L. 3; Exs. 29, 71.) The forensic
pathologist took photographs of Otis’ face during the body inspection. (4/2/15
Tr., p. 1453, L. 7 – p. 1455, L. 3; Ex. 28.) There were no wounds to Otis’ face.
(Id.)
The pathologist also testified that his initial classification of Otis’ death as
an accident was incorrect. (4/2/15 Tr., p. 1456, L. 6 – p. 1465, L. 2.) Officer
Weibe, one of the officers who initially responded to assist the medics, also
testified that since she wrote the report classifying Otis’ death as “unattended”
she had received additional training, and given that additional training she would
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not have classified Otis’ death as an unattended death. (3/26/15 Tr., p. 650, L.
15 – p. 651, L. 15.)
Dr. Smock, a police surgeon and forensic investigator with an expertise in
pattern injuries, testified that the pattern injury on Otis’ head was a pattern injury
from the claw of a hammer. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1549, L. 5 – p. 1576, L. 17; Exs. 29,
30.) The laceration on Otis’ left hand was consistent with a defensive wound
caused by the claw of a hammer. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1582, L. 20 – p. 1584, L. 22; Ex.
10.) He also testified that the constellation of injuries showed that Otis died of
blunt force trauma to the head that was consistent with at least three blows from
a claw hammer. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1580, Ls. 5-24.)
Otis’ injuries were not consistent with a fall from a ladder because the
pattern injury was the pattern of a blow from a hammer and there were three
separate lacerations. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1580, L. 25 – p. 1582, L. 19.) Further,
Dr. Smock testified that the crime scene photographs show that Otis’ body was
dragged through blood and that he did not move himself. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1587, L.
9 – p. 1590, L. 10; Exs. 22, 24.)
The state introduced evidence that Conner’s statement to the police was
not accurate. When he was interviewed by detectives, Conner claimed that on
January 2nd he was home until 2:30 or 3:00 p.m., then he went to the Meridian
Post Office, then to the Idaho Athletic Club for an hour or two, then met family
and friends at Ling & Louie’s for dinner and went straight home at 8:30 p.m.
(4/6/15 Tr., p. 1765, L. 18 – p. 1766, L. 9.) Conner told detectives that he was
not home between from around 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. until he came home after
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dinner at approximately 8:50 p.m. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1917, L. 23 – p. 1919, L. 25.)
Conner made the 911 call at approximately 8:49 p.m. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1765, L. 18
– p. 1766, L. 9.)
At trial, the state presented evidence that Conner’s claimed timeline was
not correct. The check-in history for the Idaho Athletic Club did not show that
Conner checked in on January 2nd. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1766, L. 10 – p. 1768, L. 5;
Ex. 181.) Also, there was no indication from the phone tower data that Conner
spent any time that day at the Idaho Athletic Club. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1745, L. 13 –
p. 1749, L. 9; Exs. 170, 181, 184.)
According to the cell phone records, Conner did not leave his residence,
as he claimed, at 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1768, Ls. 6-15, p. 1773, L. 23
– p. 1774, L. 24; Ex. 170; 4/3/15 Tr., p. 1714, L. 17 – p. 1727, L. 6; Ex. 170,
185.) With the exception of three calls, all of the phone calls received by Conner
connected to cell tower 402 – the cell tower closest to his house. (4/3/15 Tr., p.
1750, Ls. 19-25; Ex. 170.)
A forensic accountant testified that she reviewed Conner’s financial
situation and found that Conner’s income had substantially dropped in 2012 and
that his expenses were about twice his income. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1829, L. 14 – p.
1838, L. 16; Exs. 129, 129A.) Conner had also used up his savings account and
the balance on his credit cards was increasing. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1838, L. 25 – p.
1839, L. 19, p. 1846, L. 13 – p. 1847, L. 12.) At the end of 2012 Conner was
delinquent on about $47,000 of debt. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1848, Ls. 8-22.) In addition
to the $47,000 in delinquent debt, Conner also had more debt. (Id.)
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The state also presented evidence that Otis’ signature on check number
2201, dated 12-27-12 for $3,100 and made payable to Conner, (Ex. 122C) did
not appear to match Otis’ signature on other checks. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1667, L. 25
– p. 1675, L. 14; Exs. 122C, 133.) Based upon an examination of Conner’s
handwriting, it is highly probable that Conner wrote portions of check number
2201. (4/3/15 Tr., p. 1680, L. 8 – p. 1683, L. 23.)
Randall Conner testified that the relationship between Conner and Otis
had deteriorated due to Conner’s financial problems. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 1983, L. 17
– p. 1987, L. 7.) Otis was angry about what Conner had done with money he
had given Conner and Otis said he would not give Conner any more money.
(4/6/15 Tr., p. 1992, L. 8 – p. 1995, L. 22.)
Randall Conner testified that he had never heard anything about Otis
falling and bleeding in the house around Thanksgiving. (4/6/15 Tr., p. 2002, L.
22 – p. 2003, L. 20; 4/8/15 Tr., p. 2009, L. 25 – p. 2010, L. 25.) Randall Conner
saw his farther three times between Thanksgiving and Christmas and did not see
any injuries. (4/8/15 Tr., p. 2011, Ls. 1-22.)
Doug Conner, Otis’ youngest son, also testified that he did not see any
injuries on Otis’ head or face. (4/8/15 Tr., p. 2067, Ls. 12-22.) Billy Ray Henson,
a long-time friend of Otis’, took a ride with Otis the week before Christmas 2012,
shortly before Otis died, and Mr. Henson did not see any injuries or bandages on
Otis. (4/8/15 Tr., p. 2087, L. 8 – p. 2088, L. 21.)
After the state rested, Conner argued, under Idaho Rule of Evidence
803(3) and 803(24), for the admission of statements allegedly made by Otis to
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Kelly Riggs. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2282, L. 12 – p. 2293, L. 16.) The district court had
Kelly Riggs give an offer of proof regarding his proposed testimony. (4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2288, L. 1 – p. 2290, L. 18.)
Kelly Riggs told the district court that when he visited Otis, shortly after
Christmas, Otis had a bandage on his forehead. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2289, L. 2 – p.
2290, L. 18.) Kelly Riggs claimed that Otis told him that he fell when getting up
out of his chair, hit his head, laid there for a while, bled on the carpet, tried to
clean it up and moved a chair to cover the blood spot. (Id.) The district court
ruled that Otis’ hearsay statements were not admissible under either Idaho Rule
of Evidence 803(3) or 803(24). (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292, L. 9 – p. 2293, L. 16.)
Kelly Riggs was still allowed to testify.

Mr. Riggs testified that after

Christmas, he visited Otis and Otis had a bandage on his forehead. (4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2308, Ls. 15-19.) However, Mr. Riggs admitted on cross-examination that
when he spoke to detectives he told them he only saw an injury on Otis’ hand
and he did not tell the detectives about any bandage on Otis’ head. (4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2310, L. 12 – p. 2311, L. 14.) Paula Riggs, Kelly Riggs’ wife, testified that she
also saw a bandage on Otis’ head. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2318, L. 22 – p. 2319, L. 11.)
Conner testified that he came home on December 27 th and saw Otis had
a bandage on above his right ear and Conner saw bloodstains on the carpet that
had apparently happened the day before. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2454, L. 12 – p. 2457,
L. 10.) Conner testified that Otis had moved the rug. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2455, Ls.
18-22.) Conner said that Otis was running the SpotBot and was trying to clean
up a bloodstain near the vent. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2455, L. 23 – p. 2456, L. 24.)
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Conner claimed he had used the claw hammer to open the vent and blood got
on the hammer. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2463, L. 19 – p. 2466, L. 3.) Conner also stated
his father put the vent back into place. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2466, Ls. 4-6.)
Conner testified that all the blood that leaked through to the floorboard
came from a wound on Otis’ head that occurred on December 26th or 27th.
(4/10/15 Tr., p. 2613, Ls. 13-22.) However, Conner could not explain why the
photographs taken of Otis’ face just five days later showed no such injury. (Id.)
Conner also testified that Otis brought him check number 2201 (Ex. 122C)
and asked Conner to fill it out for $3,100. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2468, L. 24 – p. 2470,
L. 3.) Conner claimed Otis was standing over his left shoulder as he filled it out
on December 27th. (Id.; see also p. 2589, L. 3 – p. 2590, L. 2.)
However, Conner’s trucking log showed he was in Utah on December 27 th
and not at home with his father. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2590, L. 13 – p. 2592, L. 13; Ex.
135). When faced with this discrepancy Conner testified that he falsified his
trucking log book in order to get home. (Id.) However, on the stand Conner had
no explanation why his cell phone records also put him in Utah on December
27th. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2592, Ls. 17-22.)
During deliberations the jury asked two questions: “1 Is it possible to have
desision [sic] on 2 counts and hung on two counts[?]” and “2 do you need to
know which ones[?]” (R., p. 1590.) The parties agreed the answer to the first
question was “yes” and the answer to the second question was “no.” (4/16/15
Tr., p. 2901, L. 4 – p. 2902, L. 20.) The court informed the jury of the answers in
open court. (4/16/15 Tr., p. 2902, L. 24 – p. 2904, L. 9.) The court asked the
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jury if there would be any point in further deliberations regarding the two hung
counts. (Id.) All the jurors indicated that they did not believe there would be a
point in further deliberations on the two hung counts. (Id.) The jury then filled
out the verdict forms. (Id.)
The jurors indicated they could not agree on a verdict as to the grand theft
and forgery counts. (R., pp. 1592-1593.) The jury found Conner guilty of second
degree murder and of destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence.
(R., pp. 1591, 1594.) At sentencing the district court, based on a motion by the
state, dismissed the grand theft and forgery counts. (R., pp. 1601-1602.) The
district court entered judgment against Conner on murder in the second degree
and destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence. (R., pp. 1603-1607.) On
murder in the second degree, the district court sentenced Conner to 30 years
with 18 years fixed. (Id.) On destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence,
the district court imposed a concurrent sentence of five years fixed. (Id.) Conner
timely appealed. (R., pp. 1608-1611.)
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ISSUES
Conner states the issues on appeal as:
A. Did the court abuse its discretion when it excluded Otis
Conner’s statement made a week before his death that he had
fallen down in the living room, hurt his head, and bled on the carpet
as inadmissible hearsay?
B. Did the court commit fundamental error by violating Tony
Conner’s constitutional right to present evidence in support of his
defense when it excluded that evidence?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Conner failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to admit hearsay statements pursuant to the residual
hearsay exception?
2.
Has Conner failed to show the district court committed fundamental
error when it denied his motion to admit inadmissible hearsay?

16

ARGUMENT
I.
Conner Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied Conner’s Motion To Admit Hearsay Under The Catchall Exception
A.

Introduction
Conner moved to admit evidence of a conversation that Kelly Riggs

purportedly had with Otis in the week before his death. (R., pp. 1036-1041.)
Conner claimed it was admissible hearsay under the catchall exception, IRE
803(24).

4

(See 4/9/15 Tr., p. 2282, L. 12 – p. 2293, L. 16; R., pp. 1036-1041.)

The district court excluded the evidence, ruling that the purported conversation
between Kelly Riggs and Otis did not meet the necessary “trustworthiness”
requirements of the catchall exception. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292, L. 24 – p. 2293, L.
16.)
On appeal, Conner has failed to show the district court abused its
discretion. There is nothing exceptional about the alleged conversation between
Otis and Mr. Riggs that meets the high level of trustworthiness requirements
necessary for admission under the catchall exception.
B.

Standard Of Review
“A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow hearsay

evidence under Rule 803(24).” State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 403, 958 P.2d

4

Conner also moved to admit the statements under I.R.E. 803(3) as statements
of Otis’ then existing mental, emotional or physical condition. (R., pp. 10361041.) The district court ruled the statements were not admissible under I.R.E.
803(3) (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292, L. 9 – p. 2293, L. 16), and Conner does not
challenge that ruling on appeal.
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22, 29 (Ct. App. 1998). The appellate courts will not overturn the exercise of that
discretion absent a clear showing of abuse. Id. (citing State v. Zimmerman, 121
Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992); State Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
Altman, 122 Idaho 1004, 1007, 842 P.2d 683, 686 (1992)). “When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. at 403-04, 958 P.2d at 29-30 (citing State
v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Conner’s
Motion To Admit Hearsay Because Conner Failed To Establish The
Hearsay Statements Satisfied The Level Of Trustworthiness Necessary
For Admission Under The Catchall Exception
Conner moved to admit statements allegedly made by Otis to Kelly Riggs

in the week before Otis’ death, arguing the statements, though hearsay, were
admissible under the I.R.E. 803(24) “catchall” hearsay exception. (4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2282, L. 12 – p. 2293, L. 16; R., pp. 1036-1041.)
During an offer of proof, Mr. Riggs told the district court that he visited Otis
shortly after Christmas 2012, and at that time he noticed a bandage Otis had on
his forehead. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2289, L. 2 – p. 2290, L. 18.) Mr. Riggs claimed that,
when he asked Otis what happened to his head, Otis told him that he got up out
of his chair, fell down, hit his head, laid there for a while, bled on the carpet, tried
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to clean it up and moved a chair to cover the blood spot. (Id.) The district court
ruled that the hearsay statements were not admissible under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 803(24). (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292, L. 9 – p. 2293, L. 16.)
Specifically, the district court held there was not a sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness to admit these hearsay statements under the catchall provision.
(Id.) The court explained:
I do not find that it is admissible under 803(24) as the –
what’s come to be called the catchall expression [sic]. That
originated from an old case having to do with the use of old
newspapers, but it is sparingly, if at all, applied, and in part
because there needs to be some guarantee – other circumstantial
– well, as the State puts it, evidence of trustworthiness. And we
don’t have anything here that shows us anymore trustworthy than
any statement made by a witness. The problem is, as Mr. Bailey
points out, the actual witness testifying isn’t with us.
And so there is nothing particularly about the circumstances
of that conversation that would make its recitation through this
witness particularly trustworthy.
So I will not allow that conversation. You’re certainly entitled
to appeal and disagree.
(4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292, L. 24 – p. 2293, L. 16.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion.

The “catchall” hearsay

exception requires, among other things, that the hearsay statement have
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” in order to be
admissible.
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and

19

the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet
it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
See I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6).5
In this case, the alleged statements were made during what appeared to
be a normal conversation when Kelly Riggs’ visited Otis’ house.

There was

nothing about the alleged statements made by Otis to Mr. Riggs that provided
any circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness.
On appeal, Conner argues the district court abused its discretion
“because the exclusion of the evidence was based upon its conclusion that the
evidence was not particularly trustworthy.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (citing Tr., p.
2293, Ls. 11-14).) Conner alleges this was an abuse of discretion because the
catchall hearsay exception “only requires that the statement have ‘the equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’ as found in the exceptions under
803 and 804.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) Conner claims that evidence admitted
under the catchall exception “need not have extra-special trustworthiness” but
instead “need only ‘demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the
specifically stated exceptions.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (citing 2 McCormick On
Evid. § 324 (7

th

ed.), citing the Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(24)).)

5

Both Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24) (applicable where declarant is available
as a witness) and Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) (applicable where declarant is
unavailable as a witness) use the same language to determine whether a
statement falls within catchall exception.
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Conner argues that other hearsay exceptions do not depend on the
trustworthiness of the statements and therefore “[n]o showing of particular
trustworthiness is required” under the catchall exception. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
16-17.) Conner is incorrect.
Because Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24) is identical to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(24), the Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 803(24) are useful in
determining the intent of the Idaho rule. See e.g. State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538,
544, 50 P.3d 1033, 1039 (Ct. App. 2002). The Advisory Committee Notes to the
federal rule state, among other things, that admission under the catchall
exception is appropriate in “exceptional circumstances” where the statement has
a “sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness.” See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), Adv.
Comm. Notes 1974 Enactment.
The committee believes that there are certain exceptional
circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the
guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to
have a high degree of prolativeness [sic] and necessity could
properly be admissible.
…
Because exceptional cases like the Dallas County[6] case may arise
in the future, the committee has decided to reinstate a residual
exception for rules 803 and 804(b).
The committee, however, also agrees with those supporters of the
House version who felt that an overly broad residual hearsay
6

Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assoc. Co., Ltd., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961) (holding that a 50-year-old newspaper story, reporting on a fire in the
courthouse, was admissible hearsay). This appears to be the “old newspapers”
case referenced by the district court when it denied Conner’s motion. (4/9/15 Tr.,
p. 2292, L. 9 – p. 2293, L. 16.)
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exception could emasculate the hearsay rule and the recognized
exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind codification of the rules.
…
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does
not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit
hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other
exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b).
…
In order to establish a well-defined jurisprudence, the special facts
and circumstances which, in the court’s judgment, indicates that
the statement has a sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness and
necessity to justify its admission should be stated on the record.
Id.
Idaho case law also refutes Conner’s claim that the catchall hearsay
exception does not require a “showing of particular trustworthiness.” In State v.
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 399, 958 P.2d 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1998), Hawkins was
charged with first degree murder.

Hawkins’ defense theory at trial was that

Monte Olson, not Hawkins, murdered the victim. Id. at 403, 958 P.2d at 29.
Hawkins attempted to introduce hearsay statements of the victim through Eric
McKinney, the victim’s son. Id. According to an offer of proof, Eric McKinney
would have testified that the victim told him that Monte Olson had caused bruises
on her face and arm. Id. Hawkins conceded the statement was hearsay, but
argued that it was admissible under the residual hearsay exception. Id. The
district court disagreed and excluded the statement. Id. at 404, 958 P.2d at 30.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court
excluding the statements. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that nothing
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about the circumstances of the statement gave the statement “an aura of
truthfulness or reliability” as required under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24).
In excluding Eric McKinney’s testimony, the trial court explained
that the relevance of the statement was marginal, that it was not
more probative than any other available evidence since Monte
Olson was available and had given testimony on the subject, and
that the statement attributed to the victim was ambiguous. We
agree with these observations. It is apparent that the trial court
understood the issue to be a discretionary one and correctly
applied the guiding principles of I.R.E. 803(24). In addition, we note
that the first criteria of Rule 803(24), that the statement carries
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of
the other Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, is not satisfied here. The
offer of proof did not describe anything in the circumstances under
which the statement was made by the victim that would give the
statement an aura of truthfulness or reliability. Accordingly, we find
no error in the exclusion of Eric McKinney’s hearsay testimony.
Id.
Conner’s offer of proof also failed to show that the circumstances under
which the victim allegedly told Kelly Riggs that he had fallen and injured himself
gave that statement an aura of truthfulness or reliability.
In addition to Hawkins, other Idaho cases have required a showing of a
guaranty of trustworthiness in order to qualify for admission pursuant to the
catchall exception. See City of Idaho Falls v. Beco Const. Co., 123 Idaho 516,
525, 850 P.2d 165, 174 (1993) (holding that an affidavit was not admissible
under the catchall exception because it “displayed little guarantee of
trustworthiness”); Herman ex rel. Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 785, 41
P.3d 209, 213 (2002) (holding that letter from the U.S. Department of Justice
was not admissible under the catchall exception because, among other things,
“there was no evidence of sufficient indicia of reliability”); State v. Ransom, 124
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Idaho 703, 709, 864 P.2d 149, 155 (1993) (recorded interview with victim was
admissible because it complied with procedural safeguards and had equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness). Nothing about the circumstances
surrounding Kelly Riggs’ purported conversation with Otis provided any guaranty
of trustworthiness or an aura of truthfulness or reliability.
On appeal, Conner claims that the district court erred by focusing on the
reliability of Kelly Riggs. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) The state argued that
Mr. Riggs’ proffered testimony was “completely different, completely inconsistent
with what [Mr. Riggs] told law enforcement previously.” (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2291, Ls.
9-25.) The state explained below:
Again, [Mr. Riggs] told law enforcement that he didn’t notice any
injuries to Otis other than a dog bite on Otis’s hand. Now, all of a
sudden we have a large bandage on a head and describing facts
that he never ever talked about before.
Significantly, also, I think his story differs from that of Paula, his
wife, who said that it was not a large bandage but a strip bandage
that you would pull out of a box. So we have some differences
there.
(4/9/15 Tr., p. 2291, Ls. 16-25.) On appeal, Conner argues that the reliability of
the witness offering the hearsay statement is not a factor to be considered in
deciding whether the statement is admissible under the catchall exception.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18 (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293
(7th Cir. 1979)). While this is the holding of the case on which Conner relies, this
holding is in the minority. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 755 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Ariz.
1988) (holding that the majority of jurisdictions disagree with Huff and
corroborative evidence is relevant when considering trustworthiness under the
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catchall hearsay exceptions); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir.
1978) (“[C]onsideration should be given to factors bearing on the reliability of the
reporting of the hearsay by the witness.”). In addition, the purpose of the catchall
exception is served by considering the reliability of the witness reporting the
hearsay and whether there is corroborating evidence for the hearsay statement.
The purpose behind the catchall exception is to provide courts a
mechanism to admit hearsay in “exceptional circumstances” where the statement
has a “sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness.” See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24),
Adv. Comm. Notes 1974 Enactment.

Where there are legitimate concerns

regarding the reliability of the person, document or thing reporting the hearsay, it
stands to reason that the court should consider those factors when determining
whether a hearsay statement should be admitted into evidence.
Regardless, the district court did not rule that the statement was
inadmissible due only to Kelly Riggs’ questionable reliability. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2292,
L. 9 – p. 2293, L. 16.) Rather, the district court held “we don’t have anything
here that shows us anymore trustworthy than any statement made by a witness”
and “there is nothing particularly about the circumstances of that conversation
that would make its recitation through this witness particularly trustworthy” and
therefore, the court did “not allow that conversation.” (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2293, L. 24 –
p. 2293, L. 16.)

The district court was right.

This was just a conversation

between two people. There is nothing about the circumstances of the alleged
conversation that provided any guarantees of trustworthiness which would permit
hearsay to be admitted under the catchall exception.
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D.

The Alleged Conversation Between Kelly Riggs And Otis Also Failed To
Meet All Of The Remaining Requirements Of The Catchall Exception
In

addition

to

requiring “equivalent

circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthiness” the catchall exception also requires that:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
See I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6).

Conner failed to show that the proffered

statements met all of these requirements.
Conner failed to show Otis’ hearsay explanation for the presence of blood
in the living room was “more probative on the point for which it [was] offered than
any other evidence which the proponent [could] procure through reasonable
efforts[.]”

See I.R.E. 803(24), 804(6).

Again, the Idaho Court of Appeals’

ecision in Hawkins is instructive on this point.

Hawkins wanted to introduce

hearsay statements that Monte Olson had caused the bruising to the victim.
Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 403, 958 P.2d at 29. However, as the district court in
Hawkins pointed out, Monte Olson was available and gave testimony on the
subject. Id. at 404, 958 P.2d at 30. Therefore, the hearsay statement “was not
more probative than any other available evidence.” Id.
The same is true here. Conner wanted Kelly Riggs to testify that Otis said
he hit his head, bled on the carpet, tried to clean it up and moved a chair to
cover the blood spot. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2289, L. 2 – p. 2290, L. 18.) Conner
testified that Otis hit his head, bled on the carpet, tried to clean it up, and

26

covered it up. (4/10/15 Tr., p. 2454, L. 12 – p. 2457, L. 10.) Like Monte Olson in
Hawkins, Kelly Riggs’ hearsay testimony was not more probative than any other
available evidence since Conner was available and gave testimony on the
subject.
The general purpose of the rules and the interest of justice would also not
have been served by allowing Kelly Riggs to testify to the conversation he
allegedly had with Otis. Mr. Riggs admitted on cross-examination that he told
detectives that he did not notice any injuries to Otis other than an injury to Otis’
hand. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2310, Ls. 12-23.) Further, when the coroner’s office took
pictures of Otis’ head approximately five days later, there was no evidence of a
wound where Mr. Riggs said he saw a bandage. (See 4/2/15 Tr., p. 1453, L. 7 –
p. 1455, L. 3; Ex. 28.)

The interests of justice would not be furthered by

admitting what appears to be, at best, questionable testimony.

Further, the

general purpose of the rules would not be served by allowing statements made
during an ordinary conversation between two people to be admitted into
evidence, because it would eviscerate the hearsay rule. Conner has failed to
show the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to admit
hearsay.
E.

Even If The District Court Erred, It Was Harmless Error
The district court did not err. However, if it erred in denying Conner’s

motion to admit hearsay, it was harmless error. “A defendant appealing from an
objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that
such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of
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demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
Excluding the purported conversation between Otis and Kelly Riggs was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury heard substantially the same
information from Conner that Kelly Riggs would have testified to. (See 4/9/15
Tr., p. 2289, L. 2 – p. 2290, L. 18; 4/10/15 Tr., p. 2454, L. 12 – p. 2457, L. 10.)
The district court also only excluded the purported conversation with Otis, Mr.
Riggs and his wife testified regarding their observations of the bandage on Otis’
head. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2308, Ls. 15-19, p. 2318, L. 22 – p. 2319, L. 11.)
If Mr. Riggs had testified about the purported conversation with Otis, any
weight the jury might have given to his testimony would have been greatly
reduced because Mr. Riggs did not tell the police about any of this when he was
interviewed. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2310, Ls. 12-23.) Mr. Riggs proffered testimony was
also contradicted by a substantial amount of physical evidence – for example,
the amount of blood that soaked through to the floorboard, the blood throughout
the house, and the lack of injuries to the front of Otis’ face in the coroner’s
photographs. (See, e.g., 4/1/15 Tr., p. 1303, L. 7 – p. 1304, L. 23, p. 1306, L. 13
– p. 1308, L. 25; 4/2/15 Tr., p. 1453, L. 7 – p. 1455, L. 3; Exs. 28, 34, 35, 36, 82,
137.) In light of the substantial physical evidence of Conner’s guilt, (see supra
Statement of Facts), the exclusion of this purported conversation was harmless.
If the district court erred by not allowing Mr. Riggs to testify as to the substance
of the hearsay statements alleged by Otis, that error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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II.
Conner Has Failed To Show It Was Fundamental Error For The District Court To
Exclude Inadmissible Hearsay Evidence
A.

Introduction
Conner argues on appeal that the district court committed fundamental

error by not admitting inadmissible hearsay, arguing he had a Sixth Amendment
Right to present relevant evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-27.) Contrary to Conner’s
argument on appeal, the Idaho Rules of Evidence still apply to criminal
defendants.

The district court did not commit fundamental error by correctly

ruling that hearsay that failed to meet any recognized hearsay exception was
inadmissible.
B.

Standard Of Review
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-228,
245 P.3d at 979-980.
C.

Conner Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental
Error When It Made A Correct Evidentiary Ruling
Conner claims that even if the district court’s hearsay ruling was correct,

the district court still erred because excluding the hearsay evidence “violated
[Conner’s] right to present evidence.”
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(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)

Conner

acknowledges he did not raise this Sixth Amendment claim before the district
court but is raising it for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error
doctrine. (Id.)
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Conner to
demonstrate the error he alleges: “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Conner has failed to meet his burden.
1.

Conner Has Failed To Show The District Court’s Correct Hearsay
Ruling Clearly Violated His Sixth Amendment Right To Present
Evidence

Conner argues, “But even if the evidence were inadmissible under the
residual hearsay cause, the trial court committed fundamental constitutional error
in excluding the evidence because it violated [Conner’s] right to present
evidence.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Conner is incorrect. The district court’s
correct evidentiary ruling did not violate one of Conner’s unwaived constitutional
rights.
Idaho Courts have applied a two-part inquiry to determine whether a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when a trial court denies
admission of evidence. See State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 527, 530, 129 P.3d
1276, 1279 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117,
1121 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-815, 839 P.2d 1223,
1228-1229 (Ct. App. 1992).
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First, the trial court must consider whether the evidence proffered is
relevant. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional
right to present it. If the evidence is relevant, the trial court must
ask whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant’s
interest in presenting the evidence. Because the trial courts have
such broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect or
other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence, a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right will only be violated if this Court
concludes that the trial court abused its discretion.
Harvey, 142 Idaho at 530, 129 P.3d at 1279 (internal citations omitted).
Regardless whether the hearsay evidence was relevant, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it correctly ruled that the hearsay statement was
otherwise inadmissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment to present a defense right is subject to reasonable limitations, and
the rules of evidence must be complied with to assure both fairness and
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho
520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003) (“Perry 2003”).
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is
fundamental; however, this right is subject to reasonable
limitations. The exclusion of evidence does not impair the
defendant’s right “to present a defense so long as they are not
‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they serve.’” The
exclusion is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only
where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.”
With the exercise of the defendant’s right to present evidence, the
rules of procedure and evidence must be complied with to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or
innocence.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the exclusion of
evidence under the evidentiary rules does not violate the Sixth Amendment right
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to present a defense so long as the evidentiary rules are not “arbitrary” or
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citations omitted).
[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal
trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a
defense so long as they are not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to
the purposes they are designed to serve.”
Id. The high Court further explained:
State and Federal Governments unquestionably have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of
fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the exclusion of unreliable evidence
is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules.
Id. at 309 (citing Fed. Rules Evid. 702, 802, 901; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). Notably, in its citation, the
United States Supreme Court included Federal Rule of Evidence 802 – The Rule
Against Hearsay – as an example of a rule intended to exclude unreliable
evidence. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 802).
In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239-242, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058-1061
(2009), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s right to present
evidence is subject to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The state charged Meister
with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Id. at 238, 220 P.3d
at 1057. At trial Meister sought to introduce evidence that another individual,
Lane Thomas, was responsible for the murder. Id. The district court refused to
allow Meister to introduce any evidence which showed Lane Thomas was
responsible for the murders, including a confession by Lane Thomas. Id. at 238239, 220 P.3d at 1057-1058.
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On appeal, Meister claimed that the district court’s refusal to allow him to
admit evidence of Lane Thomas’ confession deprived him of his constitutional
right to provide a full and complete defense. Id. at 239-240, 220 P.3d at 10581059. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court applied the wrong
standard to determine whether Lane Thomas’ confession was admissible. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court should have analyzed
whether Lane Thomas’ confession was admissible under the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. Id. at 240-241, 220 P.3d at 1059-1060. The Court explained:
Although Thomas’ confessions are included under the umbrella of
alternate perpetrator evidence, the confessions also constitute
hearsay. Therefore, the confessions must then be analyzed for
admission pursuant to the hearsay rules.
Id. at 239, 220 P.3d at 1058.
As previously stated, this Court adopts an approach which holds
that the Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all
evidence in the courts of this State.
Id. at 240, 220 P.3d at 1059 (emphasis original). The Idaho Supreme Court
explained that the Idaho Rules of Evidence “embody the balancing test which
safeguards a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense along with
protection of the state’s interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process.” Id.
Meister should be afforded the opportunity to present his complete
and full defense, which includes the presentation of all relevant
evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Id. at 241, 220 P.3d at 1060 (emphasis added).
Conner’s argument on appeal conflicts with the holding in Meister.
Conner argues that the district court’s correct application of the Idaho Rules of
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Evidence violated his constitutional right to present evidence. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 20-25.) Meister holds the opposite. The Idaho Rules of Evidence
safeguard a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, and Conner
was afforded the opportunity to present his complete and full defense pursuant
to the limitations of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
The cases upon which Conner primarily relies do not support his
argument that the Sixth Amendment permits him to introduce evidence outside
of the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-25
(citing Perry 2003, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230; Peite, 122 Idaho at 813, 839
P.2d at 1227; State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628 (2015)).
In Peite, the defendant was charged with rape and at trial he was
prevented from presenting evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior due to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. Peite, 122 Idaho at 813, 839 P.2d at 1227. Idaho
Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1) states that the victim’s prior sexual behavior can be
admitted if, among other things, such evidence is “constitutionally required to be
admitted.” I.R.E. 412(b)(1). Thus, the Court of Appeals’ subsequent analysis of
whether the district court’s exclusion of evidence violated Peite’s constitutional
rights, was done within the requirements of Idaho Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1).
See Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-816, 839 P.2d at 1228-1230.
In Perry 2003, the Idaho Supreme Court examined whether the district
court’s decision to exclude evidence of a polygraph to bolster the credibility of
the defendant violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense. Perry 2003, 139 Idaho at 522-525, 81 P.3d at 1232-1235. In order to
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make that determination the Idaho Supreme Court held that “[w]ith the exercise
of the defendant’s right to present evidence, the rules of procedure and evidence
must be complied with to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment
of guilt or innocence.” Id. at 523, 81 P.3d at 1233 (citation omitted). Further, the
Court examined Perry’s Sixth Amendment claim within the context of allowing
expert testimony pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. Id., at 522-525, 81
P.3d at 1232-1235.
In Thomas, the Idaho Supreme Court held that evidence of the victim’s
preference for autoerotic asphyxia was relevant and the district court committed
constitutional error by excluding it. Thomas, 157 Idaho at __, 342 P.3d at 631.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court still analyzed whether this evidence was
admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, specifically Idaho Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403. Id. None of the cases Conner cites support his claim
that he has a Sixth Amendment right to present evidence that is not admissible
under the Rules of Evidence and, in fact, they show the opposite. Conner has
failed to show the district court abused its discretion and has failed to show one
of his unwaived constitutional rights was violated.
2.

Conner Has Failed To Show Any Claimed Error Was Not Harmless

Conner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the district
court’s correct evidentiary ruling, excluding the hearsay statements allegedly
made by Otis to Kelly Riggs, affected the outcome of the trial. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In an attempt to carry his burden, Conner argues
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that this Court should consider the behavior of the jury during deliberations.
7
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-27.) (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-27.)

Here, Conner argues that four days of jury deliberation and the two jury
questions should weigh against a finding of harmless error. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 25-27.) Even if jury deliberations are considered, the jury deliberations
support a finding of harmless error.

Conner’s trial lasted for 12 days and

involved the presentation of voluminous exhibits. Four days of deliberations was
relatively quick and supports a finding of harmless error.
During deliberations the jury asked two questions: “1 Is it possible to have
desision [sic] on 2 counts and hung on two counts?” and “2 do you need to
know which ones[?]” (R., p. 1590.) The court informed the jury that it was
possible to have a decision on two counts and the parties did not need to know
which ones. (4/16/15 Tr., p. 2902, L. 24 – p. 2904, L. 20.) The court asked the
jury if there would be any point in further deliberations regarding the two hung
counts. (Id.) All the jurors indicated that they did not believe there would be a
point in further deliberations on the two hung counts. (Id.)
The jury forms showed the jury could not agree on grand theft and forgery
counts. (R., pp. 1592-1593.) The jury found Conner guilty of second degree
murder and destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence. (R., pp. 1591,
1594.)

Therefore, contrary to Conner’s argument on appeal, there is no

7

If Conner’s argument, that the Court should consider jury behavior when
determining harmless error, is accepted, it is not clear how the Court would
determine what constitutes a long or short deliberation or how this factor would
be applied. It appears to require the Court to speculate as to what the jury was
doing during deliberations, which is something courts are typically loathe to do.
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evidence that the jury was conflicted regarding the two counts for which Conner
was convicted.
Further, Conner has failed to show that the evidence excluded by the
district court was not harmless because, as explained above, the hearsay
statements to which Kelly Riggs wanted to testify, were contradicted by a
substantial amount of physical evidence – for example, the amount of blood that
soaked through to the floorboard, the blood throughout the house, and the lack
of injuries to the front of Otis’ face in the coroner’s photographs. (See, e.g.,
4/1/15 Tr., p. 1303, L. 7 – p. 1304, L. 23, Tr., p. 1306, L. 13 – p. 1308, L. 25;
4/2/15 Tr., p. 1453, L. 7 – p. 1455, L. 3; Exs. 28, 34, 35, 36, 82, 137.) The state
presented substantial physical evidence demonstrating Conner’s guilt.

(See

supra Statement of Facts). The jury heard substantially the same information
from Conner that Mr. Riggs would have testified to and clearly rejected Conner’s
defense theory that all of the blood in the house was caused by Otis falling out of
his chair. (See 4/9/15 Tr., p. 2289, L. 2 – p. 2290, L. 18; 4/10/15 Tr., p. 2454, L.
12 – p. 2457, L. 10.) Additionally, the state successfully impeached Mr. Riggs
when he did testify. (4/9/15 Tr., p. 2310, Ls. 12-23.)
Even if Conner could show clear constitutional error, he has failed to meet
his burden of showing that error affected the outcome of the trial.

37

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Conner guilty of second degree murder and
destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2016.
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